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Government transfers to older persons in Canada are one of  the largest and 
fastest-growing components of the government budget. Total expenditures on 
the four primary transfer programs for older Canadians amounted to $41 bil- 
lion in 1995, which was 23 percent of the federal budget and 5.3 percent of 
GNP in that year. In 1970, total expenditures were only $2 billion, amounting 
to just 14 percent of  the federal budget and 2.3 percent of  GNP. Moreover, 
unless the system is changed, rapid growth appears likely for the near future. 
The ratio of persons age sixty-five and over to persons age twenty to age sixty- 
four is projected to grow from its current level of 19  percent to over 40 percent 
by  the year 2075. As  a result, the payroll tax necessary to finance the major 
social insurance program for older persons, the CanaddQuebec Pension Plan 
(CPP/QPP), is projected to grow from its current level of 5.6 percent of wages 
to over 14 percent by the year 2075 (Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions Canada 1993). Similar cost increases are in store for the other three 
major transfer programs to older Canadians, programs financed from general 
revenues: the Old Age Security (OAS) demogrant and the means-tested Guar- 
anteed Income Supplement (GIS) and Spousal Allowance (SPA) programs. 
As  a result of  this growing fiscal imbalance, Canada may be required to 
consider a number of reforms to its social security system over the coming 
years. But, for understanding the implications of  any potential reforms, it is 
critical to understand how this complicated web of programs affects the retire- 
ment decisions of older Canadians. Public income support is the dominant fea- 
ture of  the opportunity set facing households over age sixty-five in Canada. 
For the median household where the head is over age sixty-five, these social 
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security programs represent 61 percent of total family income; for 23 percent 
of such households, they provide more than 90 percent of family income.' As 
a result, it seems likely that the structure of  the social security program has 
important effects on the life-cycle savings and labor supply decision making of 
households and in particular on their retirement decisions. But little empirical 
analysis has been conducted of either the retirement incentives under the Cana- 
dian system or the effects of those incentives on behavior. 
The purpose of  this paper is to provide an overview of the interaction be- 
tween social security and the labor force behavior of older persons in the Can- 
ada. I do so in four steps. First, in section 2.1, I document the pertinent facts 
about the labor market behavior of  older persons in Canada, both today and 
over time. Then, in section 2.2, I describe the structure of the system of income 
support programs for older persons in Canada, summarizing the relevant insti- 
tutional details for thinking about retirement behavior. Finally, in section 2.3, 
I present the results of a simulation model designed to document the retirement 
incentives inherent in these programs for current cohorts of  retirees. Section 
2.4 concludes by considering the implications of my findings. 
2.1  The Labor Market Behavior of Older Persons in Canada 
As in most industrialized nations, the second half of the twentieth century 
in Canada has been marked by  a declining attachment to the labor force of 
older persons. In 1960, 87 percent of men aged fifty-five to sixty-four and 30 
percent of men age sixty-five and above were participating in the labor force; 
by 1993, these ratios had fallen to 61 and 10  percent, respectively. One possible 
explanation for this shift is the increasing generosity of the income support 
programs for older Canadians. But, before addressing the effects of  these pro- 
grams, it is useful to provide some more background on the labor market be- 
havior of older men and women. 
The historical  and  contemporaneous  facts  presented  in  this  section  are 
drawn from a number of different data sources. These are summarized in the 
appendix. In the appendix, I also provide a brief overview of the databases that 
are used by researchers in Canada to study retirement behavior. 
2.1.1  Historical Trends 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 graph the labor force participation rates  of  men and 
women in different age groups since 1960. I focus on three age groups: forty- 
five to fifty-four; fifty-five to sixty-four; and over sixty-five. For men, there is 
a decline in the labor force participation of  all these groups. The decline for 
the youngest group is slight, while the decline for the other groups is much 
more precipitous. The percentage decline is most dramatic for those age sixty- 
five and over, who by the end of  the sample period were very rarely participat- 
ing in the labor force. 
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Fig. 2.2  Historical trends in labor force participation of older women 
For women, the pattern is quite different: any trend toward earlier retirement 
is  dominated  by  increased  labor force participation. For  the  two  younger 
groups, participation is rising; for the oldest group, it declines slightly. 
One first-pass approach to considering whether social security is associated 
with these labor force trends is to examine related trends in social security 76  Jonathan Gruber 
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Fig. 2.3  Receipt of public retirement income 
generosity. I do so in two ways. First, in figure 2.3, I show the share of  the 
population over age fifty-five receiving various sources of retirement income. 
I consider four types of income: OAS; GIS or SPA; CPP/QPP retirement bene- 
fits; and CPP/QPP disability benefits. I do not have data on age-specific receipt 
rates before 1981, so I simply normalize total receipt by the age fifty-five and 
over population. This is not a problem for all the retirement programs, which 
are restricted to those age sixty and above; this will slightly overstate the size 
of the disability program since some recipients are under age fifty-five. 
There has been a steady growth in receipt of  OAS income and disability 
benefits. There has been a much more rapid growth in receipt of  CPPIQPP 
retirement benefits, rising from zero to roughly half the over fifty-five popula- 
tion by  1993. Perhaps owing to the growth in this income source, there was 
little growth in GIS/SPA benefits after 1975 and even a decline after 1985. 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 explore this time series in more detail, focusing on the 
period after 1980, for which I have data on receipt rates by age and sex for the 
CPP only. Each figure has four lines, representing OAS receipt, GISISPA re- 
ceipt, CPP retirement receipt, and receipt of  any of  these benefits, including 
CPP disability. These figures parallel figure 2.3 above: slightly rising OAS re- 
ceipt (more so for women than for men), more rapidly rising CPP retirement 
receipt, and a somewhat offsetting decline in GIS/SPA receipt. Of  particular 
interest in these graphs is the jump in CPP retirement receipt in 1987; as dis- 
cussed below, in this year,  early eligibility at age sixty was made available. 
Overall, there is a steady rise in receipt of income from these programs, with 
a jump in 1987. 77  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
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Second, in figure 2.6, I show the change in generosity of benefits payments 
over time. I show the replacement rate through all these four income support 
programs from 1960 to 1991 for low-, medium-, and high-earnings workers. 
These replacement rates are computed (according to the algorithm described 










































































Fig. 2.6  Replacement rates: a, without asset income; b, with asset income 80  Jonathan Gruber 
sixty-two-year-old wife.2  A key consideration in computing replacement rates 
is the level of other income (i.e., asset income) available to potential retirees 
since the GIS and SPA programs are means tested. As a result, I consider two 
cases: a couple with no asset income (fig. 2.6~)  and a couple with $4,818 in 
other income (in 1990 dollars), which is the median level of nongovernment 
income available in  1990 for families where the head is over age sixty-five 
(fig. 2.6b). 
Replacement rates grow substantially over time. In all cases, they start at 
zero until 1965 since OAS benefits were restricted to those age seventy and 
over until that year. Then, in 1966, CPP/QPP benefits were introduced; as de- 
scribed below, this program was phased in over a ten-year period; in 1967, the 
GIS program was introduced as well. As a result of these two features, the 
replacement rate grew steadily until 1975, reaching roughly 35 percent in that 
year for the median earner. In 1975, the SPA program was introduced, leading 
to a discrete jump in replacement rates due to the fact that the couple in our 
example has an eligible wife. Replacement rates then declined somewhat over 
time, as the growth rate in earnings exceeded inflation by a substantial amount 
in the rnid-1980~~  The replacement rates for the tenth and ninetieth percentiles 
follow a pattern similar to that of the median case, although more pronounced 
for the tenth percentile; in the late 1970s, replacement rates exceeded one for 
this sample. 
In figure 2.6b, I consider the effect of introducing asset income. This sub- 
stantially lowers replacement rates by  reducing the benefits received through 
the means-tested GIS and SPA programs. But the time-series pattern is similar 
to that in figure 2.6~. 
These time-series patterns yield a mixed picture of the influence of social 
security. Clearly, there is a strong correlation between the size of the program 
and the labor force participation rate of older men. But the decline in participa- 
tion of older men has continued unabated  in the  1980s and  1990s, even as 
program generosity has declined. 
2.1.2  Labor Market Behavior in 1993 
For a more detailed understanding of the time pattern of labor force partici- 
pation in recent times, I turn to the April 1992 and 1993 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF). The SCF is a large, nationally representative survey that asks 
individuals about their labor force attachment at both the point of the survey 
and the previous year as well as about income in the previous year. I pool two 
years of the SCF for added precision in my estimates of labor force participa- 
tion by age. 
The age pattern of nonparticipation for men and women is depicted in figure 
2.7. At age forty-five, the participation of men is significantly higher, although 
2. I use the earnings from the median, tenth, and ninetieth percentiles of the earnings distribution 
3.  Moreover, the earnings of the sample family head are  tied to the earnings base for CPP 
of the 1930 cohort that is used in the simulation model. 
taxation, which grew especially fast in the mid-1980s. 81  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
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Fig. 2.7  Participation rates by age and sex 
almost 80 percent of forty-five-year-old women are working. There is then a 
gradual parallel decline for men and women until age fifty-five, at which point 
the pace steepens; this is particularly true for men, with the result  that the 
participation gap closes substantially by age sixty-five. By age seventy, partici- 
pation has dropped quite low, with fewer than  10 percent of men or women 
participating in the labor force. 
Figure 2.8 considers in more detail the allocation of time among men as 
they age, by dividing activities at each age into employment, unemployment, 
disability, and retirement. There is a steady decline in employment among men. 
Most of this decline is reflected in an increase in retirement and in an increase 
in disability after age fifty-five; unemployment rates are fairly constant until 
age sixty. After age sixty, employment falls more rapidly, and unemployment 
falls as well; disability begins to fall after age sixty-five. These declines are 
reflected in rapid increases in retirement. This same exercise is repeated for 
women in figure 2.9. The patterns are similar, with the exception that a much 
larger share of women is not pursuing any of these activities (these women are 
out of the labor force for other reasons). 
2.1.3 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 examine the incidence of public and private retirement 
income for older persons. Figure 2.10 graphs two series for men only: the rate 
of  receipt of OAS, CPP/QPP, and GIS/SPA  and the rate of  receipt of  other 
public assistance through the unemployment insurance and social assistance 
(means-tested welfare) programs. This figure highlights the fact that, even be- 
fore retirement, a large share of men are receiving public assistance. As a re- 
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Fig. 2.9  Distribution of activities of women by age 
sult, the dramatic increase  in retirement  income receipt after age sixty  is to 
some extent offsetting other government transfer payments. By age sixty-five, 
there is no receipt of other transfers, and all men are receiving some form of 
retirement income. 
Figure 2.11 displays the percentage of men and women at each age who are 
receiving private pension income. This grows fairly rapidly from age fifty-five 83  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
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Fig. 2.11  Private pension receipt by sex 
on, particularly for men, so that by age sixty-seven more than half the male 
population is receiving pension income. Pension receipt for women at older 
ages is only about two-thirds as common. At the same time, however, many 
women will be benefiting from these income streams through their husband's 
pension. 
Finally, figure 2.12 shows the distribution of income sources for couples, 84  Jonathan Gruber 
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Fig. 2.12  Distribution of family income by source 
arrayed by the age of  the head  of  the family.4 I consider the distribution of 
income across four sources: earnings, capital income, private pensions,  and 
public-sector  income (predominantly retirement income for older couples, as 
shown in fig. 2.10 above). Earnings is the dominant source of family income 
until age fifty-five, at which point the earnings share begins to decline rapidly; 
even from age forty-five to age fifty-five, however, public assistance plays a 
nontrivial role (mirroring the results in fig. 2.10). The decline in earnings after 
age fifty-five is compensated for by increases in each of the other elements, 
most important among which is public income. By age seventy, public assis- 
tance income accounts for over 70 percent of family income. 
2.2  Key Features of the Income Security System 
2.2.1  The Old Age Security System 
The oldest component of  the income security system for older Canadians 
is the Old Age Security (OAS) system, which was put in place in 1952, replac- 
ing  a provincially  run  means-tested  benefits system  that had  existed  since 
1927. This program is available to anyone age sixty-five or over who meets 
certain residence  requirement^.^ The program originally provided benefits to 
4.  This differs somewhat from previous figures, where the unit of observation is the older per- 
son; this is because these income concepts are best measured at the family level. 
5. Individuals must have been  a Canadian citizen or legal resident of Canada at some point 
before application and have resided in Canada for at least ten years (if currently in Canada) or 
twenty years (if currently outside Canada). 85  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
those age seventy or over, and the age of eligibility was dropped to sixty-five 
in 1965. 
The OAS pension itself is a uniform demogrant that was equal to $387.74 
(19  percent  of  median  monthly  earnings  of  twenty-  to  sixty-four-year-old 
males in Canada) in 1995. Individuals who do not meet residence requirements 
are entitled to a partial OAS benefit. OAS benefits have been indexed to the 
consumer price index since 1972. OAS benefits are fully subject to both federal 
and provincial income taxes. In addition, there is a clawback of OAS benefits 
from very high-income individuals: in  1993, the OAS for a single individual 
was reduced by fifteen cents per dollar of net income exceeding $53,215. OAS 
benefits are financed from general taxation revenues. 
2.2.2  The CanaddQuebec Pension Plan 
The largest component of the income security system is the Canada Pension 
Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP). These programs began on 1 
January  1966 and  are  administered  separately  by  Quebec  and  the rest  of 
Canada. 
The plan is financed by a payroll tax of  2.7 percent each on both employers 
and employees. This payroll tax is levied up to the year's maximum pension- 
able earnings (YMPE), $34,900 in  1995 (or  145 percent of  median annual 
earnings). The YMPE is indexed to the growth in average wages in Canada. In 
addition, earnings up to the year's  basic exemption (YBE) are exempted from 
the computation; this is defined as 10 percent of the YMPE. 
Eligibility for this plan is conditioned on contributions for at least one calen- 
dar year during the contributory period, which is the period from attainment 
of age eighteen or 1 January 1966 if later. Benefits are then computed in several 
steps. First, the number of months used to compute the retirement pension is 
computed by subtracting from the number of months in the contributory period 
(a)  months receiving a disability pension, (b)  months spent rearing small chil- 
dren,'j (c) months between age sixty-five and the commencement of the pen- 
sion, and (d)  15 percent of the remaining months. The last three of these condi- 
tions are subject to the provision that they not reduce the contributory period 
below  120 months minus months of disability pension receipt. In addition, 
excess earnings in one month above one-twelfth of the YMPE may be applied 
to months in the same year where earnings are below one-twelfth of the YMPE. 
Second, the remaining months of earnings history are converted to current 
dollars, using as a deflator the ratio of the YMPE in each year to the average 
of the YMPE over the three years prior to (and including) the year of pension 
receipt. Finally, the benefit is computed as 25 percent of  the average of this 
real earnings history. This 25 percent ratio has been in place since 1976; from 
1967 to 1976, the program was phased in, with the share of average earnings 
paid out in benefits rising from 2.5 percent in  1967 to 25 percent in 1976. In 
6. This is defined as months where there was a child younger than seven years of  age and the 
worker had  annual earnings of  at least one-twelfth of the YBE. This provision was introduced 
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addition, before the YMPE reached the average industrial wage in 1986, it was 
rising more rapidly than average wages (12.5 percent per year). 
Until 1984 for the QPP and 1987 for the CPP, benefits could not be claimed 
before the sixty-fifth birthday, and there was no actuarial adjustment for de- 
layed claiming. Beginning at these times, individuals were allowed to claim 
benefits as early as age sixty, with an actuarial reduction of 0.5 percent for each 
month of early claiming (before age sixty-five) and an actuarial increase of 0.5 
percent for each month of delayed claiming (after age sixty-five). 
Until 1975, receipt of benefits under the CPP and QPP was conditioned on 
low earnings  levels, with earnings  above these  ceilings  taxed away at high 
rates. In 1975, these earnings tests were eliminated. With the introduction of 
early retirement in 1984 and 1987,  however, an earnings test was reintroduced: 
workers can claim early benefits only if their annual earnings do not exceed 
the maximum retirement pension payable at age sixty-five for the year in which 
the pension is claimed ($713.19, or 36 percent of median monthly earnings, in 
1995). This earnings test is applied only at the point of application, however; 
after that  point,  there  is no additional  check  on  the  individual’s  earnings.’ 
Moreover,  the  earnings  test  does not  apply  any  more once the individual 
reaches age sixty-five. 
CPP/QPP benefits are independent across spouses and are a function of an 
individual  spouse’s earnings  history  only.8 But  there  is an  interdependence 
through survivor benefits (as well as the interdependences through the means- 
tested programs described below). Spouses are eligible for survivor pensions 
if the deceased contributor made contributions for at least 10 years or one-third 
the number of years in the contributory period and if the spouse is over age 
thirty-five or has dependent children. For spouses under age sixty-five, the sur- 
vivor pension  is a combination of a flat-rate portion plus 37.5 percent of the 
earnings-related  pension  of  the deceased spouse. For spouses age sixty-five 
and over, the survivor’s pension is equal to 60 percent of  the earnings-related 
pension. The pension used to calculate the survivor benefit is not subject to 
actuarial  adjustment.  If  the  surviving  spouse  is  receiving  his  or her  own 
earnings-related pension, then the combination of the two pensions cannot ex- 
ceed the maximum retirement  pension  available in the year that the later of 
these two pensions commences. Children of  deceased  contributors  are also 
entitled to a survivor benefit if under eighteen or a full-time student between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-five; this benefit is a flat amount. There is also 
a lump-sum death benefit,  which is generally equal to half the annual CPP/ 
QPP pension amount. 
Benefits  are legislated  to increase  with  the  consumer price  index  (since 
1973), average over the twelve-month period ending with October of the pre- 
ceding year. Benefits are fully subject to federal and provincial income taxes. 
7. Earnings after the initial receipt of a CPP/QPP pension are not included in the subsequent 
8. Couples do have the option of sharing their benefits for income tax purposes since taxation 
average earnings used to compute future benefits. 
is at the individual level. 87  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
2.2.3  The Guaranteed Income Supplement and Spousal Allowance 
The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is a means-tested  supplement 
available to recipients of OAS that was introduced in 1967. Individuals must 
reapply for the GIS each year, and the means test for eligibility (and benefit) 
levels is repeated. The income level for means testing is defined in the same 
way as for income tax purposes, with the important exclusion of OAS pension 
income. Unlike OAS or CPP/QPP benefits, GIS benefits are based on family 
income levels. 
There are separate single and married guarantee levels for the GIs; in 1995, 
these were $460.79 for singles and $300.14 (each person) monthly for married 
couples (23 percent and 15 percent of median monthly income, respectively). 
Benefits are then taxed away as income rises at a rate of 50 percent, although 
a couple with one member over age sixty-five and one under age sixty is taxed 
at only 25 percent with an initial amount of income exempted. 
The Spousal Allowance (SPA), which was introduced in 1975, is a means- 
tested  monthly  benefit  available  to sixty- to sixty-four-year-old  spouses  of 
OAS recipients and to sixty- to sixty-four-year-old widowdwidowers. For the 
spouse of an OAS recipient, the benefit is equal to the OAS benefit plus GIS 
at the married rate; the OAS portion is then taxed at 75 percent as income rises 
until it is reduced to zero, and then the combined GIS benefits are taxed at 50 
percent. For a widowed spouse, the benefit is equal to the OAS plus the GIS 
at the widowed rate and is taxed equivalently. Both the GIS and the SPA guar- 
antees are also indexed to inflation, and neither source of income is subject to 
either the federal or the provincial tax system. 
2.2.4  Hazard Rates 
One natural question is whether the labor force behavior of older Canadians 
lines up with the incentives inherent in the systems described above. I explore 
this in figures 2.13 and 2.14, which show hazard rates out of the labor force 
for men and women, respectively. This is measured as the increase in the rate 
at which workers leave the labor force from the previous age, relative to the 
stock of workers participating at the previous age. 
For men, there is clear evidence of  a dramatic increase in the rate at which 
workers  leave the labor force at  age sixty-five, which is the age of  normal 
retirement for CPP/QPP and of entitlement to OAS benefits. Fully 40 percent 
of  the men who remain in the labor force at age sixty-five leave during that 
year. There is also evidence of a response to the CPP/QPP early retirement age 
of sixty, but it is not particularly  strong relative to the hazards in surrounding 
years. This is consistent with the notion that the response to early retirement 
entitlements  emerges  only  slowly, as  documented  by  Burtless  and  Moffitt 
(1986) for the United States. For women, the pattern is similar: a pronounced 
spike at age sixty-five, with some evidence of a response around age sixty, but 
nothing particularly pronounced. 88  Jonathan Gruber 
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Fig. 2.14  Hazard rate out of labor force for women 
2.2.5  Other Public Programs 
In addition to the federal retirement programs, there are a variety of provin- 
cial programs that provide supplements to low-income retirees. For example, 
a program in Ontario provides $80.00 per month to Ontario residents who are 
recipients of the GIs; but these funds are taxed back at 50 percent as other 
(non-OAS or -GIs) income rises. 89  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
A final program that is important for considering retirement incentives is 
the disability insurance program that is operated through the CPP/QPP. This 
program provides benefits to those workers unable to work owing to disability. 
The basic benefits structure consists of two portions: a flat-rate portion, which 
is a lump sum paid to all disabled workers, and an earnings-related portion, 
which is 75 percent of the applicable CPP/QPP retirement pension, calculated 
with the contributory period ending at the date of disability. This program is 
fairly stringently screened, and fewer than 5 percent of older Canadian men 
are on disability insurance. Nevertheless, recent research shows that the benefit 
structure of this program has important effects on labor supply (Gruber 1996). 
2.2.6  Private Pension Coverage 
Another important feature of  the retirement landscape is private pensions. 
Defined-benefit pension plans share many of the same incentive features as 
public insurance plans. In fact, many Canadian workers are covered by occupa- 
tional pensions, or RRPs. In 1992,47.5 percent of paid workers were covered 
by occupational pensions, with coverage being slightly higher for males than 
for females. Ninety percent of  plan members were in defined-benefit plans, 
although the share in defined-contribution plans has been growing recently. 
Defined-contribution plans may also affect retirement through income effects, 
but there should not be tax/subsidy effects on the work decision since the pay- 
out is not dependent on work patterns. 
2.2.7  The Retirement Effects of Income Support Programs in Canada 
While a large U.S. literature on social security and retirement exists (for a 
review, see Diamond and Gruber, chap. 11 in this volume), much less work has 
been done in the Canadian context. Recently, Baker and Benjamin (1996) have 
explored the effects of the introduction of the early retirement option under the 
QPP in 1984 and the CPP in  1987. They found that there was little effect of 
this policy change on the labor force behavior of sixty- to sixty-four-year-olds 
in the short run. But there is some suggestion of  a longer-run response, as a 
“spike” in the rate at which workers leave the labor force has emerged at age 
sixty in recent years (as shown in fig. 2.13 above). Baker and Benjamin (1997) 
explore another important policy change, the removal of earnings tests under 
the CPP and QPP in the 1970s. They find that the removal of earnings testing 
was associated with a significant shift from part-time to full-time work among 
older workers. 
2.3  Retirement Incentives 
2.3.1  Simulation Modeling 
In this section, I use a model of benefits determination under these four 
programs to assess the incentives of social security on retirement through ac- 90  Jonathan Gruber 
crual rate effects. Given the similarities of the CPP and QPP programs, the 
incentives are calculated for the representative CPP worker. This program em- 
beds the benefits computation and clawback structure of these four programs 
to compute benefits for a worker, given his age, spouse’s age, earnings history, 
and date of retirement. 1  use the base-case assumptions about the CPP for wage 
and price growth, as well as assumptions about  the growth of the program 
contribution rate, to model incentives. The program computes benefits for the 
worker and survivor and death benefits for the case where the worker has died. 
The next step in the simulation is to take these monthly benefit entitlements 
and compute an expected net present discounted value of social security wealth 
(SSW); this includes the future entitlements from all four programs. This re- 
quires projecting benefits out until workers reach age one hundred and then 
taking a weighted sum that discounts future benefits by  both the individual 
discount rate and the prospects that the worker will live to a given future age. 
The methodology for doing so is described in Diamond and Gruber (chap. 
11 in this volume). For the worker himself, this is fairly straightforward; it is 
simply a sum of future benefits, discounted backward by time preference rates 
and mortality rates. For survivor benefits, it is more complicated since I must 
account for the joint likelihood of survival of the worker and the dependent. In 
the base case, I use a real discount rate of 3 percent, although I vary this below. 
To adjust for mortality  prospects,  I use sex/age-specific life tables for  1990 
from Statistics Canada. Finally, to compute net social security wealth, I sub- 
tract out the CPP payroll tax payments that the individual would make during 
any continued work. I add both the employee and the employer shares of the 
payroll tax, under the assumption that the employer shares fully borne by the 
worker in the form of lower wages. All figures are discounted back to age fifty- 
five by both time preference rates and mortality risk. 
For the output of the simulations, I calculate three different concepts. The 
first is the net of tax replacement rate, the rate at which social security replaces 
the (after-tax) earnings of the worker should he continue working in that year. 
It is important to do this calculation on an after-tax basis in order to account 
for the facts that (a)  OAS, GIs, and SPA benefits are not taxable and (b),  even 
for taxable CPP benefits, the individual may be in a lower tax bracket when 
retired. I model the average tax rate faced by earners of different earnings lev- 
els in each year, assuming that the tax system stays constant into the future 
(with the same rate structure and indexed tax brackets). The second concept 
is the accrual rate, the percentage change in social security wealth from the 
previous year. 
Finally, I compute a taxkubsidy rate, which is the absolute change in social 
security wealth over the potential earnings from working that next year. This 
represents the implicit tax on or subsidy to continued work, in terms of the net 
change in social security wealth that is implied by that additional year of work. 
The numerator of this tax/subsidy rate is the opposite of the change in social 91  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
security wealth from working the additional year. The denominator is the po- 
tential earnings over that additional year. Thus, if this figure is positive, it im- 
plies that the social security system causes a disincentive  to additional work 
through  forgone social security  wealth. This is the relevant  concept for the 
worker who is trading off leisure (on social security) against continued work. 
Note that, in computing these concepts, I use the unconditional mortality 
risk beyond age fifty-five; that is, there is some probability that the worker may 
be dead at each year after his fifty-fifth birthday. An alternative approach would 
be to use conditional life tables at each year: for example, for the worker con- 
sidering retiring  on his sixty-third birthday, I discount the future by  the age 
sixty-three-conditional  life table. The correct approach here depends on the 
perspective from which this computation is taken. My approach is appropriate 
if the computation is taken from the perspective of the forward-looking fifty- 
four-year-old  who is considering the retirement incentives at all future ages. 
The alternative would be appropriate for year-by-year decision making on re- 
tirement. Since I discount all the dollar figures back to age fifty-five by both 
time preference and mortality risk, both concepts yield the same taxhbsidy 
effects (since both numerator and denominator are deflated); however, they 
will yield  somewhat different values of social security wealth and therefore 
different accrual rates. 
To produce the base-case numbers, I use a typical individual who was born 
in January 1930 and thus turned age sixty-five in January  1995. In theory, in 
order to calculate benefits for a worker, I would need his entire earnings history 
since  1966. In practice, I use a “synthetic”  earnings history, which uses the 
median earnings of a cohort through time. As a first step in creating this syn- 
thetic earnings history, I have computed information on the median earnings 
by  calendar year and age cohort from the  1973-93  Survey of  Consumer Fi- 
nance (SCF data).9 More specifically, I take the median earnings for a sixty- 
two-year-old in 1992, for a sixty-one-year-old in 1991, and so on, back through 
the survey years. To backcast from 1973 to 1966, before cross-sectional survey 
data are available, I first estimate cross-sectional age-earnings profiles in the 
1973 survey. I then apply these estimates to “un-age” the workers in the 1975 
survey  back  to  1966 and  deflate  these  pre-1975  profiles  by  average  wage 
growth by region,  using  data from Gruber and  Hanratty (1995). To  project 
earnings beyond  1992, I use the growth in the YMPE (actual to  1995, pro- 
j ected thereafter). 
In  pursuing  this calculation, I found a relatively  steep decline in  median 
earnings after about age fifty, which presumably reflects the fact that more and 
more of the earning population is working only part-time. However, the syn- 
thetic individual is considering the decision to work full-time for an additional 
9. These data are collected annually at the individual level from 1981 on. Before then, they were 
collected biannually at the family level; I use the information for male heads of household. 92  Jonathan Gruber 
year, so this  skews the true nature of the underlying earnings history. As a 
result, I use this synthetic earnings profile through age fifty and then assume 
that earnings stay constant in real terms from age fifty-one on. 
For the purposes of the simulations presented below, I assume that workers 
claim social security benefits at the point of their retirement or when they be- 
come eligible if they retire before the point of eligibility. I assume initially that 
the worker’s wife is exactly three years younger than he. I also assume that she 
has never worked. Finally, a critical parameter is the level of outside (i.e., asset) 
income  available to the worker  since the GIS and SPA benefits  are means 
tested. Following the computation of replacement rates above, I consider two 
cases: zero outside income and outside income of $4,818. 
2.3.2  Base-Case Results 
Table 2.1  shows the base-case results, with  zero asset income. Each  row 
represents the age of the worker in the last year that he worked; that is, the first 
row represents the effect of working during the fifty-fourth year and retiring 
on the fifty-fifth birthday  (1 January  1985). The first column shows the net 
replacement rate. This concept is not defined until  the worker  can actually 
claim benefits, which occurs if his last year of work is at age fifty-nine so that 
he retires at age sixty. 
At that first point of possible claiming, the replacement rate is roughly  18 
percent. The replacement rate then rises slowly to age sixty-five, as workers 
increase their social security benefits by delaying claiming. At age sixty-five, 
there is a large discrete jump, as the OAS benefit begins, and then a continued 
slow rise from actuarial adjustment. Then, at age sixty-eight, there is another 
Table 2.1  Base-Case Incentive Calculations, No Outside Income 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax I 
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discrete jump from the wife’s OAS benefit and a continued rise from actuarial 
adjustment. Thus, for the worker who works through his sixty-ninth year and 
collects on his seventieth birthday, social security replaces roughly all his after- 
tax earnings. 
The next three columns show the evolution of social security wealth over 
time. In order to understand these results, it is useful to recap the five mecha- 
nisms through which additional work affects the computation of social security 
wealth: (1) The worker must pay social security taxes on his earnings, lowering 
net social security wealth.  (2) The additional year of earnings is used in the 
recomputation of  social security benefits, replacing a previous low (or zero) 
earnings year (besides the 15 percent of lowest months that have already been 
excluded). Additional work raises net social security wealth through this chan- 
nel. But this is true only if  these additional years of  earnings are above the 
YMPE and some earlier years of earnings were below. For the median worker, 
in fact, all years of earnings are above the YMPE. (3) The additional year of 
work, for work at ages sixty-two and beyond, implies a delay in claiming. This 
raises future benefits through the actuarial adjustment, but it implies fewer 
years over which benefits can be claimed. As a result, there is an ambiguous 
effect on net social security wealth. (4) The additional year of work will lower 
GIS and SPA benefits through means testing, both of the income from work 
and of the higher CPP benefit that results from additional work. (5) For each 
year into the future that I consider, there is some chance that the worker will 
die, lowering his net social security wealth. Thus, it is unclear ex ante whether 
the social security system will tax or subsidize additional work in any given 
case. 
As table 2.1 shows, a worker who retires on his fifty-fifth birthday has accu- 
mulated $148,138 in social security wealth. There is then a small increase in 
social security wealth for work during the fifty-fifth year. This is because the 
worker still has not completed his earnings history, with the result that addi- 
tional years of work therefore replace a zero in the benefits computation. Simi- 
larly, the system is neutral with respect to work during the fifty-sixth year since 
roughly (in this example) six months of  work in that year are required to com- 
plete the earnings history. After this point, additional earnings do not affect 
average earnings, as noted above, since earnings in every year are above the 
YMPE. From age fifty-seven on, therefore, social security wealth uniformly 
declines, with the result that the  system is placing  a net tax on work. As a 
result, the accrual rate is negative in all years except the first. 
The final column shows the taxhbsidy rate. There is a slight subsidy to 
work of  4.2 percent in the fifty-fifth year, as noted above, and then taxes on 
work thereafter. This tax is lower than the payroll tax that finances the CPP 
through age sixty since earnings below the YBE and earnings above the YMPE 
are exempted from tax. But there is no other form of taxbenefit linkage in this 
range since there is no benefit recomputation for additional work for a worker 
whose earnings each year were above the YMPE. 94  Jonathan Gruber 
Table 2.2  Base-Case Incentive Calculations, Outside Income 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax I 
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Beginning in the sixtieth year, tax rates on continued work rise more rapidly. 
There is actually an increase in the underlying value of the man's  CPP wealth 
over the range of work in the sixtieth through the sixty-third years. But this is 
overshadowed by the scheduled rise in the CPP tax rate and the reduction in 
CISISPA benefits. 
Beginning with work during the sixty-fourth year, the tax rates rise substan- 
tially as the (constant) actuarial adjustment becomes insufficient to compen- 
sate for delayed claiming of benefits.I0 In addition, beginning in the sixty-fifth 
year, there is a much larger tax rate through the GIS/SPA program. This is due 
to the fact that the CIS benefit kicks in once the worker is age sixty-five and 
receiving the OAS. The tax rate then declines again beginning with work dur- 
ing the sixty-seventh  year. This is because the wife is turning sixty-five and 
therefore moving  out of the range of  eligibility for the  (means-tested) SPA 
benefit. As a result, there is less of a disincentive for earnings for the husband. 
Table 2.2 presents analogous results for the case with outside income. In this 
case, the pattern of tax rates is quite similar through age sixty. From age sixty 
on, however, the tax rates on continued work are somewhat lower, with tax 
rates peaking at 32 percent (instead of the 41 percent tax rate with zero asset 
10. The relatively large jump at age sixty-four is due to the particulars of this example. There 
is a much larger rise in the CPI from 1992 (when the worker is age sixty-two) to 1993 (age sixty- 
three) than from 1993 to 1994 (age sixty-four). As a result, the increase in benefits is unusually 
large from age sixty-two to age sixty-three and unusually small from age sixty-three to age sixty- 
four. Thus, there is little change in the tax rate on continued work from age sixty-two to age sixty- 
three and a large change from age sixty-three to age sixty-four; in other years, the change from 
age sixty-two to age sixty-four would be spread across both years. 95  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
Table 2.3 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax / 
of  Work  Rate  SSW  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
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income). This pattern is a simple reflection of the implicit tax on work put in 
place by  the GIS and SPA programs. With more outside income, these pro- 
grams are irrelevant. As a result, raising CPP benefits through working to an 
older  age is  relatively  more  attractive  since  doing  so does  not  reduce  the 
means-tested  entitlement. Thus, the net effect of the Canadian retirement in- 
come system on work incentives is fairly sensitive to whether the family is in 
the range where means-tested benefits are relevant. 
2.3.3  Other Cases 
Table 2.3 explores these same results for a single worker for the case with 
outside income. Until age sixty, the pattern of incentives for the single worker 
is very similar to that for the married worker. From age sixty on, however, the 
tax rates are dramatically lower for the single worker than for the base-case 
married worker. This reflects the fact that there is no implicit taxation through 
the SPA program in this case since there is no spouse who can benefit from 
that program. That is, these findings illustrate that the CPP system itself is very 
close to being actuarially fair after the age of early eligibility but that the large 
tax rates that we saw earlier arose from the means-tested transfers that were in 
place through the SPA  system. If  there is no outside income for this single 
worker, however, there are nontrivial taxes after age sixty (on the order of  8 
percent), reflecting the clawback of GIS benefits. 
For retirement from age sixty-five on, however, there is once again a sub- 
stantial tax for the single worker, owing to unfair actuarial adjustment of the 
CPP benefit. These taxes rise steadily  with age, as the actuarial adjustment 
becomes increasingly unfair. At the oldest ages in my computations, the results 96  Jonathan Gruber 
Table 2.4  Tenth Percentile Earner, No Outside Income 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
of Work  Rate  ssw  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
54  ...  140,871  0  0  0 
55  ...  141,388  517  .0037  -  ,0474 
56  ...  141,377  -12  -  .ooo  1  .0011 
57  ...  141,042  -335  -  ,0024  ,0322 
58  ...  140,696  -  346  -  .0025  ,0348 
59  .28  10  140,344  -352  -  .0025  ,0369 
60  ,3141  139,124  -  1,220  -.0087  ,1362 
61  ,3373  137,743  -1,381  -  ,0099  ,1580 
62  .4143  136,422  -1,321  -.0096  ,1584 
63  .4608  135  ,O 14  ~  1,408  -.0103  ,1711 
64  1.2210  132,699  -2,315  -.0171  .3057 
65  1.2427  128,110  -4,589  -.0346  ,6377 
66  1.2650  123,311  -4,799  -.0375  ,7035 
67  1.7663  11  8,940  -4,370  -.0354  ,6776 
68  1.8110  115,124  -3,816  -.0321  ,6276 
69  1.8596  11 1,432  -3,692  -  ,032  1  ,6548 
are once again similar for married couples and singles as wives have moved 
out of the range of SPA eligibility. 
One particularly interesting dimension of heterogeneity is the lifetime earn- 
ings of workers. Tables 2.4 and 2.5  contrast the case of a worker whose earn- 
ings are at the tenth percentile of the earnings distribution with that of one 
whose earnings are at the ninetieth percentile. In doing this calculation, I as- 
sume that the age-earnings profiles of both workers are the same; I simply shift 
the intercept at age fifty for these profiles. For the tenth-percentile worker, I 
assume no outside income; for the ninetieth-percentile case, I assume the me- 
dian outside income. 
Before age sixty, these  cases yield  fairly  similar results.  One interesting 
finding is that the tax rates on both high and low earners are lower than those 
on the base-case  worker. This is because  more of  the earnings of  the high 
earner are above the YMPE and therefore exempt from taxation;  similarly, 
more of  the earnings of the low earner are below the YBE and also exempt 
from taxation. But these differences are fairly slight. 
But, from age sixty on, a striking difference emerges. For the low-income 
worker, this system is very generous, replacing 28 percent of his income if he 
retires after his fifty-ninth year, 122 percent of his income if he retires after his 
sixty-fourth year, and 186 percent of his income if he retires after his sixty- 
ninth year. At the same time, the tax rates in place are very large; they reach a 
peak of over 70 percent for retirement on the seventieth birthday. Thus, the 
worker with low lifetime earnings and no outside income faces a large disin- 
centive in considering further work after age sixty and particularly from age 
sixty-five on. 97  Social Security and Retirement in Canada 
Table 2.5  Ninetieth Percentile Earner, Outside Income 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
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Fig. 2.15  Taxhbsidy rates by earnings level 
For workers with higher lifetime earnings, the replacement rates through the 
system are much lower, as are the implicit tax rates. Even at their peak, the tax 
rates on continued work are below 20 percent. These patterns are compared in 
figure 2.15, which illustrates these differences: similar tax rates until age sixty, 
with a growing divergence thereafter. 
Finally, table 2.6 considers a different permutation to the earnings history: 98  Jonathan Gruber 
Table 2.6  Incomplete Earnings History, Outside Income 
Last Year  Replacement  Accrual  Tax/ 
of  Work  Rate  ssw  Accrual  Rate  Subsidy 
54  ...  117,249  0  0  0 
55  ...  11 8,264  1,015  ,0087  -  ,0488 
56  ...  119,252  988  .0084  -  ,0487 
57  ...  120,247  995  .0083  -  ,0492 
58  ...  121,237  990  .0082  -  ,0505 
59  ,1783  122,213  977  ,008  I  -.0515 
60  ,1995  121,293  -920  -.0075  .0508 
61  .2155  120,387  -  906  -.0075  ,0509 
62  ,2450  119,462  -925  -  .0077  .0539 
63  ,2696  118,295  -1,167  -  ,0098  .0709 
64  .5085  115,617  -2,678  -.0226  ,1695 
65  .5 186  111,257  -4,361  -.0377  .2882 
66  .5275  106,582  -4,675  -  ,0420  ,3236 
67  ,8497  102,978  -3,604  -.0338  .2621 
68  3807  100,323  -2,654  -.0258  .2034 
69  ,9143  97,499  -2,824  -  ,028  1  .2287 
assuming that the worker was unemployed for four years and that he therefore 
has an incomplete earnings history  (for the case with outside income). This 
offers an incentive for the worker to retire later since additional years of work 
replace zeros in the computation  of  CPP benefits. This is illustrated by  the 
sizable subsidy to work through age fifty-nine; this subsidy arises because of 
the replacement of zero values in the earnings history. From age sixty to age 
sixty-two, there is a tax rate on continued work, but it is smaller than in the 
base case. Then, from age sixty-three on, the tax rate is the same as in the base 
case as the earnings history has been completed. 
2.4  Conclusions 
The system of retirement income provision in Canada is a critically impor- 
tant feature of the opportunity set of older workers who are considering retire- 
ment. This set of four programs provides a large source of income support for 
retired workers, but it also potentially taxes continued work among those who 
wish to work beyond the age of early retirement eligibility. I have documented 
that there is clearly an important effect of  these programs on the timing of 
retirement. Future work on retirement in Canada could usefully explore the 
effect of program generosity on retirement behavior. In particular, it is impor- 
tant to assess the role that these (often quite large) implicit taxes play in de- 
termining retirement decisions, both on average and across groups of  workers 




Labor force participation data are from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM CD- 
rom. Data were also provided directly by  Statistics Canada. Population data 
are from Economic Council of  Canada (1976), Denton and Ostry (1967), and 
Statistics Canada (1 995). Data on program receipt are from Human Resources 
Development Canada (I  996). 
Contemporaneous Data 
data for 1992 and 1993. 
All contemporaneous figures were tabulated by the author from April SCF 
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